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Tinbergen Rules the Taylor Rule
by Thomas R. Michl
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This paper elaborates a simple model of growth with a Taylor-like monetary
policy rule that includes inﬂation-targeting as a special case. When the inﬂation
process originates in the product market, inﬂation-targeting locks in the unem-
ployment rate prevailing at the time the policy matures. Although there is an
apparent NAIRU and Phillips curve, this long run position depends on initial
conditions; in the presence of stochastic shocks, it would be path dependent.
Even with an employment target in the Taylor Rule, the monetary authority
will generally achieve a steady state that misses both its targets since there
are multiple equilibria. With only one policy instrument, Tinbergen’s Rule dic-
tates that policy can only achieve one goal, which can take the form of a linear
combination of the two targets.Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man; But will they come when you do
call for them? (Shakespeare, King Henry IV)
The title of this paper contains no solecism or missing conjunction. Tin-
bergen’s (1952) Rule that the number of achievable policy goals can not exceed
the number of policy instruments dictates that a mechanical monetary policy
rule can fail to achieve its stated objectives of full employment and target in-
ﬂation. The problem is particularly acute with inﬂation-targeting, deﬁned by
complete indiﬀerence to the employment level. This kind of policy can lock
in an unemployment rate prevailing at the time the policy matures, as well as
create the illusion that this rate represents a unique NAIRU (i.e., the zero of a
Phillips curve in diﬀerence form) even when the long-run unemployment rate is
path dependent. Moreover, the authorities cannot avoid this fate by including an
employment target. The family of models that illustrate these statements below
is designed to substantiate the misgivings that heterodox economists allegiant
to the classical-Keynesian synthesis1 have about inﬂation-targeting. Given the
rising popularity of this approach to monetary policy, including the appointment
of an avowed inﬂation-targeter, Ben Bernanke, as Chair of the Federal Reserve
Board, it would seem appropriate to raise some questions about the wisdom of
rule-based monetary policies.
There are four features of the models elaborated here that betray their
classical-Keynesian origins. First, they assume that inﬂation originates in the
product market and is propagated through the labor market by a wage-setting
process that maintains a constant real wage. (In a more dynamic setting with
technical change, this might be replaced with a constant wage share.) This
assumption creates openings for path dependency in the employment rate (the
1Two recent works that limn out the contours of heterodox macroeconomic theory in an
irenic spirit are Taylor (2004) and Foley and Michl (1999). The former puts somewhat more
emphasis on the Keynes-Kalecki tradition, the latter on the classical tradition. For another
attempt to substantiate the misgivings that heterodox economists have about monetary policy
rules, see Freedman et al. (2004).
1ratio of employed workers to the labor force)2.
Second, they assume that all saving originates in proﬁts; workers do no
saving. This could easily be relaxed, with modest gains, as long as the class
structure of accumulation retains a prominent place in the architecture.
Third, our ﬁrst model below assumes that the labor force is endogenous,
with labor supply elastic at some given reservation wage. Classical-Keynesian
economists remain open-minded about whether (or to what extent) labor short-
ages constrain growth in modern economies, unlike their neoclassical counter-
parts who seem to take exogeneity of the (fully employed) labor force as part of
their scientiﬁc dogma. Our second model pursues the theme of labor-constrained
growth.
Finally, the production function is strictly ﬁxed-coeﬃcient, which prevents
us from sweeping the crucial problem of capacity (or capital) utilization under
the rug by means of incredible assumptions about technology.
These models have more Keynesian characteristics in the short run but clas-
sical characteristics in the long run, having descended with modiﬁcation from
an eﬀort by Dum´ enil and L´ evy (1999) to distinguish between the fast adjust-
ment process associated with eﬀective demand and the slow adjustment process
associated with accumulation.
1 Elements of the models
A central bank reaction function implies that the monetary authorities recognize
that the inﬂation process depends on a Phillips curve-like relationship3 and that
2In the most famous classical model of the labor market and accumulation, the Goodwin
(1967) model, the unemployment rate and the wage share cycle around a ‘center’. Formally,
this means that wherever in the phase space the system begins, it will come right back around
to the same point. Any displacement, in other words, would be permanent.
3We will refer to this as the Phillips curve, even though Phillips (1958) himself was con-
cerned with the relationship between wage inﬂation and unemployment. It seems that general
usage has expanded the term to include the relationship between price inﬂation and unem-
ployment.
2the rate of capacity utilization depends on the interest rate, through an IS-curve.
We will model the inﬂation process (with p representing the inﬂation rate) as a
function of the rate of capacity utilization, u,
p+1 = p + a(u − 1) (1)
For convenience, we deﬁne the normal or desired rate of utilization as unity,
and suppress time subscripts where they can easily be inferred. Note that normal
utilization does not represent full utilization in an engineering sense. Firms
are assumed to build capacity slightly ahead of demand, for example so as to
accommodate ﬂuctuations in orders without losing customers. The assumption
is that they will respond to high demand partly by stepping up production and
partly by raising prices faster in the next period. Inﬂation thus has an inertial
element, perhaps because of expectations-formation or some other slow process.
Most textbook presentations of the Phillips curve (often unwittingly) make
the implicit assumption that full employment in the labor market and normal
capacity utilization (full employment of capital) correspond. In other words,
they presume that suﬃcient capital has accumulated to make full employment
possible; the well-behaved neoclassical production function is one device for
achieving this legerdemain. By contrast, this paper is preoccupied with getting
right the relationship between these two measures of slack.
Money wages are assumed to respond to prices one-for-one so that their
ratio, the real wage, remains constant. Thus, the distribution of income is
parametric. We will use π to represent the proﬁt share. For simplicity, we
assume, without loss of much generality, that workers live hand-to-mouth and
consume their real wage, w = (1 − π)x, where x is labor productivity. We will
assume that changes in utilization of capacity are Solow-neutral: they leave
output-per-worker unchanged and they are fully reﬂected in the output-capital
ratio. Empirical evidence suggests this is not too far from the truth, although
labor hoarding and other eﬀects may cause violations in practice.
The monetary authority operates according to a ﬁxed Taylor-type rule, or a
3central bank reaction function4. Its policy instrument is the real interest rate,
R. Because of decision and implementation lags, we assume that it responds to
current conditions by setting the prevailing rate for the next period. One good
justiﬁcation for this lag is that central banks control only the short-term interest
rate on interbank lending while the long-term rates that govern investment
spending change much more slowly as expectations are digested by ﬁnancial
markets. In general, we write the central bank reaction function as:
R+1 = Rn + h0(e − ¯ e) + h1(p − ¯ p) (2)
where Rn is the neutral (or natural) rate of interest, e is the employment rate,
and bars identify target values.
To obtain an IS curve, we make use of an investment equation that is the
donkey engine of neo-Kaleckian modeling. Investment is responsive to the de-
gree of utilization, on the grounds that high utilization signals that demand is
expanding faster than capacity. This equation can also be interpreted as an
error-correction response function for investment, sensitive to deviations from
the normal rate of utilization5. We will include the interest rate, on the grounds
that investment that cannot be ﬁnanced through internally generated funds




= d0 − d1R + d2u
For simplicity, we will assume that a constant proportion, s of proﬁts are




4This is not precisely the rule Taylor (1999) had in mind; he works with the nominal
interest rate, for example, which places diﬀerent restrictions on the inﬂation-coeﬃcient needed
for stability. And his rule targets the output gap (derived from the full employment level of
output), rather than employment itself. We will take liberty on occasion and loosely refer to
the reaction function as the “Taylor Rule.”
5For a very clear presentation of recent debates about how to interpret this investment
equation, consult Lavoie et al. (2004).
4where ρ is the normal output-capital ratio, sometimes referred to as capital
productivity.
The short run is assumed to be long enough to permit changes in utilization
that eliminate any excess demand in the product market. Equating planned





where c = sπρ − d2 represents the marginal excess saving generated by an
increase in utilization. Stability of the short-run adjustment mechanism (i.e.,
the multiplier) requires that c > 0, and we will assume that this condition
prevails. We also assume that the monetary authority knows the structure of




Having determined the utilization rate in any short-run period through the
IS equation, the rate of capital accumulation, g, can be obtained from either
the investment or the saving equation above.
Note that this model operates along standard Keynes-Kalecki lines in the
short run. The principle of eﬀective demand reigns: investment determines sav-
ing through changes in utilization. An autonomous increase in investment (an
upward shift in the intercept term of the investment equation) has a multiplier
eﬀect on utilization in the short run. An increase in the propensity to save has
a deﬂating eﬀect on utilization, sometimes called the paradox of thrift. A de-
crease in the real wage, or equivalently an increase in the proﬁt share, also has
a deﬂating eﬀect on utilization, sometimes called the paradox of costs. (Firms
experience a decline in their real labor costs, yet they wind up reducing out-
put.) It is apparent that the paradox of costs is really a variant of the paradox
of thrift; it occurs because a redistribution toward the high-saving category of
income (proﬁt) raises the social saving rate6.
6Leaving proﬁtability out of the investment equation, as we have done, makes the paradox
5In the long run, as we will see, the model gravitates (or, to be more precise,
can gravitate) toward the growth rate speciﬁed by the saving function, which
of course is (a version of) Harrod’s warranted rate of growth. With utilization
at its normal level, the warranted rate is:
g∗ = sπρ
For ease of exposition, let us assume that the capital-employed labor ratio
(usually denoted by k) equals unity; one unit of capital employs one unit of labor
(we can always choose units so that this is true). We can deﬁne the employment
rate, e, as the ratio of employed workers to the labor force, L. Finally, deﬁne
the ratio of capital to the labor force (not to employment, which is why we use
a Greek letter) as κ. Now we can see that the employment ratio depends on the





For future reference, note that the unemployment rate will be 1 − e. We
work mostly with the employment rate. We will also ignore the fact that there
is in principle an upper bound on the employment rate. A value greater than
unity might reﬂect overtime or moonlighting.
We know that u(R) evolves with the interest rate. Thus, to gain some
appreciation of the dynamics of employment, we can concentrate on the capital-
labor force ratio. Assuming that the rate of growth of the labor force is n, this
ratio will grow by a factor (1 + g)/(1 + n) each period. Substituting from the
IS equation and the investment function, we can obtain the diﬀerence equation
κ+1 = (A − BR)κ
where A = (1 + d0 + d0d2/c)/(1 + n) and B = (d1 + d1d2/c)/(1 + n). We will
model the labor force growth rate ﬁrst as a variable, in which case this equation
of costs a foregone conclusion. Including a term for the proﬁt share produces a richer array of
outcomes. For a lucid survey of what is known about the paradox of costs, see Blecker (2002).
6will be unnecessary. But when we model the labor force in the traditional way
(with a natural rate of growth), this equation will play a central role.
The three equations, (1)-(3), deﬁne a system of autonomous non-linear dif-
ference equations in the general form
p+1 = p(p,R)
κ+1 = κ(κ,R) (4)
R+1 = R(p,κ,R)
This system will have diﬀerent dynamic properties depending on the closure
with respect to the labor market.
2 Endogenous growth constrained by capital
Both classical (Foley and Michl, 1999) and Keynesian (Thirlwall, 2002) economists
are open to the view that capitalist economies operate in a labor-surplus en-
vironment. Under these conditions, at least as a ﬁrst approximation it makes
little sense to include an employment target. We pursue the behavior of equation
system (5) under the hypothesis of pure inﬂation targeting (h0 = 0).
2.1 Stability and dynamics
In this case, the capital-labor force ratio, κ, drops out of the system altogether
since it has no role to play. We are left with a two-dimensional linear autonomous
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7The stability of the equilibrium of the system requires that the eigenvalues





This stability condition makes some sense. An increase in the slope of the IS
curve (decrease in c), an increase in the sensitivity of the inﬂation process (a),
or an increase in the interest sensitivity of investment (d1) all demand that the
monetary authorities become less aggressive about inﬂation-ﬁghting, lest they
cross the tipping point and become a destabilizing inﬂuence.
A more meaningful constraint on policy is probably the condition that sep-
arates a stable node from a stable focus, which is that the discriminant be
positive. Ruling out repeated over- and undershooting the steady state path




In light of the concern voiced by central bankers over achieving what Alan
Greenspan has called a “glide path” to a “soft landing,” this is probably the
more relevant constraint.
It is easy to see that the ﬁxed point or equilibrium (assuming that it exists)
of this little three-equation model occurs where inﬂation achieves its target level,
p = ¯ p, utilization achieves its normal level, u = 1, and the interest rate is neutral
R = Rn. The growth rate of capital will than be given by the justly-famous
Cambridge equation (in inverted form),
g∗ = sπρ = srn
where rn represents the normal rate of proﬁt. It is also clear that the monetary
authorities must know the neutral rate of interest, Rn = (d0 − c)/d1, in order
to achieve their target rate of inﬂation, something that may not be that easy in
practice.
8[Figures can be found at the end of the paper.]
Now we can substantiate the claim that this model operates along classical
lines in the long run. An increase in capitalist saving, for example, will raise the
rate of accumulation in the long run even though its impact eﬀect, in the short
run, will be to reduce utilization and growth. A decrease in the proﬁt share (i.e.,
a real wage increase) will lower the long-run growth rate even though it activates
the paradox of costs in the short run. Figure 1 illustrates a wage increase. Both
growth and utilization rise in the short run (a response sometimes called “wage-
led growth”), but recover their long-term values; the growth rate is permanently
lower.
Of course, it is formally possible that an equilibrium with normal utilization
could fail to exist, if the IS curve is improperly positioned. To rule this out, the
investment equation must satisfy the inequality d0 + d1 > g∗. If this inequality
is violated, the system falls into a Krugman-style liquidity trap that requires
the monetary authorities to target a negative real interest rate, something which
has proved diﬃcult to achieve in practice. Dumenil and Levy (1999) avoid this
thorny issue by setting up their model in terms of the money supply, eﬀectively
taking the position that it is the availability of ﬁnance or liquid capital that
constrains the investment process. One advantage of the present set-up is that
it creates a bridge to the structuralist Keynesian models, which could be inter-
preted as applying to a world in which the investment inequality is persistently
violated because of a deﬁcit of entrepreneurial animal spirits.
Finally, consider another trail that leads back to Harrod: the reaction func-
tion and Dumenil and Levy’s money supply process are both needed to con-
tain the Harrodian Instability that results when the warranted rate and actual
rate diverge. The basic problem can be seen by thinking about the investment
function as a short-run or temporary expediency. If the system settles into a
short-run equilibrium, say above normal utilization, we might expect some kind
of low-frequency response (not modelled here) by managers that would shift the
function upward so that capacity grows faster than output. But this will just
9lead to a higher level of utilization in the next period. If we want to main-
tain this interpretation of the investment function7, some mechanism must be
incorporated to prevent a knife-edge equilibrium.
2.2 The labor market
This model elides the labor market from its inner mechanisms. To add realism,
we can add a labor supply component, but this is just embroidery, like the ﬁnish-
ing touches on a Thomas Kinkade painting. Let us assume that workers observe
the current equilibrium, and make a decision about whether to participate that
will be realized in the next period. There may be migration or immigration ef-
fects, for example, which account for the lag in labor supply response. Workers
supply labor elastically at a reservation wage, wr, which obviously must be less
than the existing wage. They participate whenever the expected wage equals
or exceeds the reservation wage. The expected wage is just the employment
rate, reﬂecting the probability of securing employment, times the wage, or ew.
Workers are eﬀectively myopic, projecting the current employment level into the
future through a form of adaptive expectations8. Equating the expected wage






Beginning from some initial condition, L(0), this equation couples up with
the system above, equations (5), to generate the path of the labor force and the
employment rate. Since the system eventually achieves steady state growth at
the rate g∗, we can see that the labor force will also achieve this growth rate.
7Again, Lavoie et al. (2004) provides a succinct overview. Their resolution, more in the
Keynesian spirit, is to allow managers to form expectations adaptively about what level of
utilization is normal, so that in a conﬂict situation, the normal level of utilization adjusts
toward the actual level.
8There is an obvious coordination problem here that we are ignoring. My favorite dance
club is Dullsville when no one shows up, and a virtual soccer riot when it is too crowded. In
between, it’s terriﬁc. Somehow, the clientele manage to hit that golden mean without any
central direction.








This makes some sense. A higher wage, relative to the reservation wage,
makes it more attractive to take a chance on participation. There will be more
“wait unemployment” as a result, or equivalently, a lower employment rate.
Faster growth raises the employment rate, apparently because of the rather
naive treatment of expectations.
The important point is that a supply-based theory of the equilibrium un-
employment rate is quite possible, and the model looks and feels like a real
economy. In particular, the unemployment rate will show no historical trend,
just as it does in real capitalist economies for which the statistical record goes
back far enough, such as the U.K. (Layard et al., 1991). At this point we might
be tempted to imagine that the monetary authority would want to include an
employment target in the reaction function, but let us resist that temptation
and turn to the alternative closure with an exogenous or predetermined labor
force.
3 Exogenous growth constrained by the labor
force
The most common assumption in growth models of the last half century has
been that the labor force grows at its “natural” rate, n. The great Keynesian
economist Roy Harrod would recognize the question that confronts us: what is
the relationship between the warranted rate, sπρ, and the natural rate? Let
us ﬁnesse the question by assuming that the warranted and natural rates are
equal, perhaps because the Kaldor-Pasinetti mechanism involving changes in
the distribution of income has achieved this result9. Now the question is, will
9Alternatively, we might hypothesize that the natural rate adjusts to the warranted rate,
putting us back in an endogenous growth setting.
11the level of employment match the labor force?
3.1 Inﬂation-targeting
When the monetary authority pursues pure inﬂation targeting, the employment
rate will be dependent on initial conditions. If there were any stochastic shocks,
say to the labor force, the employment rate would be path dependent.
To see this, ﬁrst let us recognize that the dynamics of the model continue
to be controlled by the equation system (5) for the endogenous model above.
Without any way for the employment rate to aﬀect monetary policy or inﬂa-
tion, it will just tag along behind capital accumulation and capacity utilization.
Assume for the sake of realism that inﬂation-targeting is adopted out of the
steady state (e.g., during a period of putatively excessive inﬂation). Once the
policy matures, and the system enters its steady state path, the rate of utiliza-
tion will be at its normal level (u = 1) and the employment rate will equal the






When the system enters the steady state, of course, g = n, and this equation
reduces to
κ+1 = κ
or in other words, the capital-labor force ratio is a unit root process.
This means that the capital-labor force, and ultimately the employment ratio
upon which it depends, would be path dependent in the presence of stochastic
shocks. In the present, deterministic setting, they will settle down to whatever
value they happen to have when the inﬂation-targeting regime matures and the
system enters its steady state. If the monetary authority imposes inﬂation-
targeting by choosing the current inﬂation rate as its target precisely when the
system is in a steady state, then whatever the employment rate happens to be
at that moment will remain the employment rate in the future.
12Moreover, the inﬂation rate and unemployment rate (1 − e) will obey a
Phillips-like relationship, complete with an apparent “natural rate of unem-
ployment” or NAIRU. Substituting into the true Phillips curve, and solving for










This could be called the pseudo-Phillips curve (in diﬀerence form) for this sys-
tem. An unsuspecting econometrician might be tempted to estimate this rela-
tionship, thinking that it was generated by a stochastic process, when in fact, it
is only reﬂecting the co-movements in u, κ, and p. Figure 2 illustrates through
a numerical example, jazzed up by setting the response parameter above the
threshold for a negative discriminant. In this case, unlike the endogenous model
above, the zero of the Phillips curve (in its diﬀerence form), which represents the
NAIRU or inﬂation-neutral unemployment rate, is path dependent and could
be changed if the political will were available, thus compounding the damage
done by rote econometrics.
This model illustrates why heterodox economists are suspicious of the claims
(Bernanke, 1999) sometimes made on behalf of inﬂation targeting. In this sys-
tem, a monetary authority that chooses to impose inﬂation targeting when the
employment rate happens to be low will have eﬀectively locked in mass unem-
ployment. Any element of path dependency or hysteresis in the inﬂation-neutral
unemployment rate validates this concern. The accumulated evidence may be
frustratingly ambiguous on the behavior of the inﬂation-neutral unemployment
rate, but a disturbing amount of empirical work reveals that it has path de-
pendent (or at least time variant) qualities10. The common-sense view that
high unemployment in Europe may have something to do with low growth rests
comfortably with this model.
10The classic Layard et al. (1991) is a good source. More recently, the essays in Howell (2005)
should undermine any misplaced enthusiasm for the empirical foundations of the orthodox, or
any, theory of the natural rate of unemployment.
133.2 Taylor-like rule
Adding an employment target into the central bank reaction function seems like
an easy ﬁx, but it turns out that this guarantees little. Like Owen Glendower
in the piquant prefatory quotation, the monetary authorities are destined for
disappointment.
We are now in a position to examine the full model written out in equation
system (5). First, aside from the trivial solution, it is clear that the steady state




In order to secure stable inﬂation, utilization must clearly be at its normal
level (the inﬂation function is “accelerationist” with respect to utilization). This
in turn requires that the interest rate achieve the neutral rate, and these two
results together imply the third equality.
Inﬂation and (un)employment are a diﬀerent story. They are constrained by
the reaction function, equation (2), which settles down, as we just saw, on the
neutral rate of interest. This implies that the equilibrium employment rate and
inﬂation rate are going to be found on the line segment:
p∗ = ¯ p + (h0/h1)¯ e − (h0/h1)e∗ (6)
where e∗ ≥ 0 and, (let’s say) p∗ ≥ 0. It is true that this segment contains the
target point, (¯ p, ¯ e). But it also contains an uncountable inﬁnity of other points.
It represents the terminal surface of the system. Where the system winds up is
a contingency of initial conditions, implying that shocks render both the steady
state inﬂation rate and the capital-labor force ratio (which determines the steady
state employment rate) path dependent.
It is not unlikely that the central bank, following a Taylor-like rule, will
achieve a stable position with excessive inﬂation (by its standards) and excessive
14unemployment (or inadequate employment) if the policy is initiated during a
period of high inﬂation and low employment. Once again, a central bank with
an overweening attachment to policy rules would have realized the worst fears
of heterodox economists by locking in mass unemployment. If employment
is satisfactory, but the authorities choose to disinﬂate by setting the inﬂation
target below current inﬂation, the system will never recover that satisfactory
employment level; workers will suﬀer unemployment of iatrogenic origin.
Figure 3 brings this point to life. This time the reaction function’s pa-
rameters have been set within their thresholds (see below) for a nonnegative
discriminant. There is some alternation in the real variables, but a monotonic
path of disinﬂation prevails along the model’s transient. Note that the previous
simulation, with pure inﬂation-targeting, would look very much the same, ex-
cept the terminal surface would be the horizontal line at ¯ p. Since the transient
moves in a southwesterly direction, it seems intuitive that a pure inﬂation-target
would create more iatrogenic unemployment.
If the target rate of inﬂation were set above the current rate, the system could
gravitate toward a point on the terminal surface to the right (southeast) of the
goal post, (¯ e, ¯ p), in Figure 3. In other words, monetary policy could actually
raise the level of employment. Heterodox concerns that inﬂation targets tend
to get set too low are not without foundation.
As above, it is possible (with some diﬃculty) to analyze the stability con-
ditions imposed on the parameters of the central bank reaction function. Since
the system is non-linear, the ﬁrst step is to obtain the Jacobian of equation
(5), evaluated at the equilibrium point (i.e., some point lying on the terminal
surface deﬁned above). The stable space consists of all the (h0,h1) pairs that
satisfy the condition that the roots (eigenvalues) of the Jacobian lie within the
unit disc. This space identiﬁes local asymptotic stability only; global stability
of non-linear systems can get tricky (Elaydi, 2005, Ch. 5). Some details are
provided in the Appendix. The important point is that the stable space is not
empty.
It is also possible to determine what values of the parameters of the reaction
15function iron out any oscillations, as we did above in the simpler case of a pure
inﬂation target. In this case, the characteristic equation is cubic, and the rele-
vant question is whether the polynomial discriminant is nonnegative (all roots
are real) or negative (one real root, two complex conjugates). Thanks to the
work of some brilliant Italian mathematicians in the 16th century (Cardano,
Tartaglia), all the heavy lifting has been done and made available on the web-
site of some brilliant mathematicians in the 21st century (Wolfram, Weisstein).
Its hard to say with any degree of generality, but it appears that taming the
oscillations calls for low values of h0. On the other hand, h1 needs to be chosen
with the Goldilocks principle in mind: it can be too large or too small. Again,
some details are provided in the Appendix.
3.3 Employment targeting
We might ask whether a populist11 central bank could do better by adopting
pure employment-targeting, letting the inﬂation rate seek its own level. The
answer is no. Just setting h1 = 0 in the reaction function results in an ill-
conditioned model. By cutting equation (1) out of the system, we also cut
utilization out of the system’s feedback loops. The system itself becomes un-
controllable as a result.
And if the central bank replaced the inﬂation target by a utilization target
in its reaction function, controllability would be restored but at a price. In this
case, the terminal surface is a linear combination of the equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate and the equilibrium utilization rate. By analogy with the behavior of
the system under a Taylor rule above, it is clear that only by a ﬂuke will both
targets be achieved. As a result, the inﬂation rate will either rise steadily (if
the utilization rate settles into a value above unity) or drop continuously. The
fact that the inﬂation rate refuses to seek its own level makes pure employment-
targeting unworthy of further consideration in the context of this model (though
11The premise here is that workers and the poor are generally not hurt much by inﬂation,
but bear the brunt of unemployment, so a central bank that identiﬁed with those groups might
adopt a pure employment target, or at least deemphasize inﬂation.
16it may be worthy in some other context).
4 Conclusion
In eﬀect, the Taylor Rule suﬀers from a deﬁcit of instruments in this model.
It only allows the authorities one tool (the interest rate) for regulating growth
directly. Thus, it is possible to hit a pure inﬂation target, but adding an em-
ployment target forces the system toward a stable point that combines the two
targets. Indeed, the target we do achieve is a linear combination, expressed in
equation (6), of the two nominal goals set by the monetary authority, exactly
what you might expect from Tinbergen’s Rule.
The authorities cannot expect to achieve their goals by implementing a Tay-
lor Rule mechanically, but this model does permit the capital stock to be used
as a “state variable” in the sense of control theory. Setting up the monetary
authority’s task as an optimal control problem might be one way to overcome
the inadequacy of rule-based policy, and one lesson might be that the authori-
ties should apply the response coeﬃcients ﬂexibly. In the language of optimal
control theory, the monetary authority needs to take account of the terminal
(transversality) condition. Otherwise, it will be destined to “eﬃciently” guide
the economy toward an unwanted destination, as we have seen it do under a me-
chanical policy rule. But this raises the question, what objective function should
a monetary authority optimize in a society with such divergent economic inter-
ests (workers, managers, rentiers, ﬁnancial capital, industrial capital, retirees,
to name a few)? Answering will require taking on some refractory issues sur-
rounding the costs and beneﬁts (and their distribution) of unemployment and
inﬂation12
12It has always struck me that the Federal Reserve Board, perhaps the largest employer
of Ph.D. economists in the USA, has produced no prominent corpus of research on the real
costs of unemployment (including, for example, their health eﬀects), and very little balanced
work on the costs of inﬂation. Would it be unreasonable to suggest that resources directed
toward these questions could have a salubrious eﬀect, especially if they incorporated the full
spectrum of viewpoints?
17One ﬁnal point concerns the original formulation of the inﬂation process in
terms of the rate of capacity utilization. The main results would change mate-
rially if we replaced that formulation with the traditional Phillips curve, using
the (un)employment rate as the measure of slack. In that case, the unemploy-
ment rate would have to get down to its inﬂation-neutral level in the steady
state. And capacity utilization would be taken care of by the reaction function,
assuming that the authorities have a good idea what the neutral rate of interest
that achieves full utilization actually is. So even pure inﬂation targeting could
work as its advocates have claimed, achieving “full employment” and controlling
inﬂation.
The traditional Phillips curve attributes the source of inﬂation to the la-
bor market. In the version of it that makes sense to heterodox economists,
inspired by Rowthorn (1977), class conﬂict over the real wage erupts in rising
inﬂation when workers are in a strong bargaining position as the result of low
unemployment. Firms operate as Kalecki originally speciﬁed they would, set-
ting prices as a mark-up over labor costs and thereby acting as a transmission
mechanism for wage-inﬂation to propagate price-inﬂation. But there is nothing
in this theory to prevent hysteresis eﬀects from creating path dependencies in
the inﬂation-neutral rate of unemployment.
The point is that inﬂation could well be either a product market phenomenon
as it is here or a labor market phenomenon. Both theories have the numen
of truth about them. Does it make sense to bet the job security of millions
of workers on which one is closer to the truth, or that the inﬂation-neutral
equilibrium (if there is only one) is completely path-independent? The models
presented here suggest that it would be wise for central bankers to remain
ﬂexible, to retain employment targets as well as inﬂation targets, and to remain
careful students of the evolving art and science of macroeconomics in all its
pluralist manifestations.
18APPENDIX
The Jacobian of equations (5), evaluated at the equilibrium employment





















The characteristic equation for the Jacobian is:
λ3 + a1λ2 + a2λ3 + a3 = 0






d1(ach1(1 + n) − e∗(c(h0(1 + n) + h1n) + d0n(h1 − h0)))
c2(1 + n)
a3 =
d1e∗n(ch1 + d0(h1 − h0))
c2(1 + n)
Gandolfo (1997, pp. 90–91) points out that recent work on cubic equations
has whittled the number of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the roots of
the characteristic equation to lie within the unit circle down to three, basically
working out the implications of the Schur-Cohn criterion. These are:




which will always be satisﬁed (see text ruling out pure employment-targeting,
or h1 = 0).
(ii). 1 − a1 + a2 − a3 > 0. This condition reduces to a linear inequality of
the form h0 < b0 − b1h1, with b0 and b1 functions of the parameters.
(iii). 1−a2+a1a3−a2
3 > 0. This condition reduces to a polynomial inequality
in the form h(h0,h1) < 0.
19The intersection of the sets deﬁned by conditions (ii) and (iii) form the stable
set of reaction function parameters. The stable set is illustrated in Figure 4 for
the parameter values used in the simulations reported in the paper.
The condition for real roots to the characteristic equation makes use of
Cardano’s Formula and the polynomial discriminant deﬁned by
D = Q3 + P2
where Q = (a2
1−3a2)/9 and P = (2a3
1+27a3−9a1a2)/54. These formulas, com-
plete with historical background, were obtained from the World of Mathematics
website (http://mathworld.wolfram.com) maintained by Wolfram Research and
authored by Eric Weisstein. I have taken the liberty of reversing the signs
given there, in order to maintain the convention associated with the quadratic
equation that a negative discriminant gives complex roots.
The necessary and suﬃcient condition for all three roots to be real is that
D ≥ 0. This reduces to a polynomial inequality in the form D(h0,h1) ≥ 0.
Examination of its properties for the parameter values used in numerical simu-
lations supports the statements about the threshold values of h0 and h1 reported
in the text.
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Figure 1: In the short run, a real wage increase has Keynes-Kaleckian eﬀects on the utiliza-
tion rate (left scale, solid line) and rate of accumulation (right scale, dashed line) but classical
eﬀects in the long run. The system began in a steady state, with u(0) = 1 and g(0) = .05.
The proﬁt share was reduced in period 1 forward from .0625 to .0575, and the neutral rate of
interest was recalibrated in period 2 forward. The parameters are h0 = 0, h1 = .05, ¯ p = .05,
s = .8, ρ = 1, d0 = .1, d1 = .1, d2 = .04, and a = .5. (Data have been joined by lines for
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Figure 2: A pseudo-Phillips curve is generated by an episode of disinﬂation. In this simula-
tion, the inﬂation target is 0.05, and the employment target is 0.95, making the unemployment
target 0.05. The apparent inﬂation-neutral rate of unemployment is around 0.055. The sys-
tem began with p(0) = .1 and e(0) = .95 = ¯ e. The parameters are h0 = 0, h1 = .1, n = .05,
s = .8, ρ = 1, d0 = .1, d1 = .1, d2 = .04, and a = .5.
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Figure 3: A Taylor-like rule, imposed when the system is operating at the target employment
rate (¯ e) but above its target inﬂation rate (¯ p), generates a trajectory (dashed line) toward the
terminal surface (solid line) created by the central bank reaction function, stopping short of
the target point. All parameters are the same as in the previous ﬁgure, except h0 = .1. (Data







Figure 4: The stable space (shaded area) formed by conditions (ii) and (iii) of the Schur-
Cohn criterion is illustrated for the parameter values: n = .05, s = .8, ρ = 1, d0 = .1, d1 = .1,
d2 = .04, and a = .5, e∗ = .945.
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